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Abstract
The Discrete Logarithm Problem is well-known among cryptographers, for its computational hardness that
grants security to some of the most commonly used cryptosystems these days. Still, many of these are limited to
a small number of candidate algebraic structures which permit implementing the algorithms. In order to extend
the applicability of discrete-logarithm-based cryptosystems to a much richer class of algebraic structures, we
present a generalized form of exponential function. Our extension relaxes some assumptions on the exponent,
which is no longer required to be an integer. Using an axiomatic characterization of the exponential function,
we show how to construct mappings that obey the same rules as exponentials, but can raise vectors to the power
of other vectors in an algebraically sound manner. At the same time, computational hardness is not affected (in
fact, the problem could possibly be strengthened). Setting up standard cryptosystems in terms of our generalized
exponential function is simple and requires no change to the existing security proofs. This opens the field for
building much more general schemes than the ones known so far.
1 Introduction
Many cryptosystems are proven to be secure under a particular computational assumption, such as RSA [33] for
instance, resting its security on the difficulty of the Factoring Problem. Many others, such as ElGamal [13, 14],
are based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem [27] and other related problems on which the focus of this paper lies.
Henceforth, we consider a group Gq of prime order q, for simplicity. Therein, the Discrete Logarithm Problem
(DLP) is the following: given y, g ∈ Gq, g 6= 1, and q, find x ∈ Zq, such that y = gx. The integer x is called
the discrete logarithm of y to the base g, here denoted as dlogg(y). The problem of constructing gx1x2 solely from
(gx1 , gx2) is known as the Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP) [12]. To decide, whether a given triple (y1, y2, y3) ∈ G3q
is of the form (gx1 , gx2 , gx1x2) is known as the Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDP) [2]. Obviously, solving
the DLP gives trivial solutions to the DHP and the DDP, respectively. Similarly, solving the DHP leads to an
efficient solution of the DDP. The inverse directions are less obvious. The DLP and the DHP have been shown
to be computationally equivalent for groups whose order is free of multiple large prime factors [25, 23]. This is
the case for Gq, since q is prime. In contrast to that, the computationally equivalence between the DHP and the
DDP has only shown to hold for groups whose order only consists of small primes factors [24]. In contrast, the
computationally equivalence between the DHP and DDP for Gq, q prime, has not been shown yet.
Several cryptosystems are based on Discrete Logarithm Problems. The ElGamal encryption scheme, for instance,
is semantically secure under the assumption that solving the DHP is hard. Moreover, under the assumption that
the DDP is hard, it is guaranteed that upon two given ciphertexts, it is not efficiently possible to decide, if both
contain the same plaintext. Unfortunately, the ElGamal encryption scheme is insecure against chosen ciphertext
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attacks [39]. The Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [9, 10] overcomes this drawback, while resting its security on
the DDP. Besides encryption schemes, the DLP can be found in several signature schemes, such as in ElGamal’s
[13] or Schnorr’s [35], or in the Digital Signature Algorithm [29]. Interactive proofs of knowledge [1] (in particular
Σ-proofs [7]), commitment schemes [4, 8, 11], verifiable encryption [40], verifiable secret sharing [15, 30, 16], and
secure multi-party computation [17] belong to advanced cryptographic techniques, that are often based on Discrete
Logarithm Problems. Especially the DDP finds wide attraction in applications where privacy plays an important
role, such as in voting schemes [6] or anonymous credential systems [5].
Recently, we managed to generalize the standard exponential function on a group Gq to a pendant that takes pairs
in the base and the exponent, rather than scalars. This function shares the basic properties of exponential functions,
and allows us to call it “exponentiation”. Because all four input-elements are uniformly included (we call this
property “fusion”) for the computation of the output, we call this kind of exponential function “Fusion Exponential
Function” (see end of Section 4.2 for a discussion of the fusion-property). The latter also avoids confusion with
ordinary exponentiation. The Fusion DLP (FDLP), the Fusion DHP (FDHP) and the Fusion DDP (FDDP) are
defined in the usual way. Our prelimiary results can be found in [34].
In this paper we sketch the results of [34] in a more constructive way and generalize the Fusion Exponential
Function such that it works with n-tuples of elements of Gq in the basis and n-tuples of elements of Zq in the
exponent, for n not being restricted to n = 2 as it is the case in [34]. We also show that the basic properties are still
common with ordinary exponentiation and that the latter is a special case of the Generalized Fusion Exponential
Function, i.e. it also holds for n = 1. Afterwards, we define the FDLP, FDHP and FDDP in the generalized
setting and show security relations between the Discrete Logarithm Problems in the ordinary and the fusion setting.
Finally, applications and possible security benefits are discussed.
2 Exponentiation in a Group of prime Order
2.1 Basic Properties
As is well known, gx is defined as the x-fold product of g with itself. For all g, h ∈ Gq and x, y ∈ Zq we have the
following properties:
(gx)y = gxy (1)
gx+y = gxgy (2)
(gh)x = gxhx (3)
Furthermore, g0 = 1 and g−x = (gx)−1. The properties stated above are fundamental for realizing discrete-
logarithm-based cryptosystems.
Remark 1. Property (3) is redundant, as being consequence of (1) and (2) and the fact that h can be written as gw,
for w ∈ Zq and g ∈ Gq \ {1}, i.e.
(gh)x = (ggw)x
(2)
= (g1+w)x
(1)
= g(1+w)x = gx+wx
(2)
= gxgwx
(1)
= gx(gw)x = gxhx.
2.2 Computing Discrete Logarithms
Computing y = gx, for a given g ∈ Gq and x ∈ Zq, can be done efficiently. For instance, the Square-and-Multiply
[28] algorithm requires only O(log q) group operations. However, no efficient generic algorithm for solving the
DLP is known, except for some special cases where parameters are chosen in a particular manner. A generic
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algorithm does not exploit any specific properties of the objects to which it is applied [38]. It works on any group,
where each element can be encoded as a binary string and group operations can be considered as a black-box.
One of the best known generic attack algorithms are Pollard’s rho algorithm [32] and Shank’s Baby-Step-Giant-
Step algorithm [37], having an exponential running time, lying in O(√q) and O(√q log q), respectively. Due to
their computational complexity they are also called generic square-root attacks [41]. If the order of the group is
a composite n, then the best attack known to date is the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [31], computing x in O(√r)
steps, where r is the largest prime factor of n.
For a chosen group, an algorithm may exist that takes advantage of some special properties of the group. Such an
algorithm is not generic since it is not applicable to any group structure. For instance, if Gq is a subgroup of Z∗p,
where p is a prime, the Index-Calculus algorithm [28] can compute x in sub-exponential computing time, being
more efficient than a generic square-root-attack. However, this algorithm cannot be applied to Gq being a subgroup
of an elliptic curve group over a Finite Field, for instance. So far, no algorithm is known that computes elliptic
curve discrete logarithms faster than in O(√q) steps.
3 Basic Fusion Exponential Function
In the fusion-setting, as introduced in [34], exponents are defined as pairs of integers in Zq. It is convenient to have
the exponents of the extended exponentiation coming from a field (in fact a commutative ring with 1 would suffice,
but a field gives rise to a wider class of applications), while in the basis a group is most likely sufficient. A natural
choice for the source of the exponents is thus a field of order p = q2, which is easily constructed by choosing
q ≡ 3 (mod 4), and setting Fp := Zq[X]/(X2 + 1), for instance.
Remark 2. For simplicity, we sometimes denote a pair (a, b) ∈ Z2q or (a, b) ∈ G2q by a sans-serif letter, say x, for
instance.
Let us review the derivation of the basic Fusion Exponential Function, as given in [34]1. This idea will later
be amended to yield the general scheme. To realize schemes based on the Diffie-Hellman paradigm [12], any
exponential function candidate needs to obey property (1) at least, so let us define a simple form of generalized
exponential function, taking a pair in the exponent as
gx = g(c,d) := (gc, gd), (4)
where x ∈ Fp, x = (c, d) and g ∈ Gq \ {1}, thus g having order q. Suppose we are given a term gx according
to the convention (4), and we wish to find (gx)y such that the result equals gxy, i.e. we need to calculate the latter
term given only gx = (gc, gd) and y = (e, f), where y ∈ Fp. This is easily done by doing the multiplication in the
exponent within Fp, as
gxy = g(c,d)(e,f)
= g(ce−df,cf+de)
(4)
= (gce−df , gcf+de)
(2)
=
(
gceg−df , gcfgde
)
(1)
=
(
(gc)e(gd)−f , (gc)f (gd)e
)
. (5)
Hence, we can define
(gx)y = (g(c,d))(e,f)
(4)
= (gc, gd)(e,f)
1There, referred to as Fusion-Exponentiation.
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through (5) as
(gx)y := ((gc)e(gd)−f , (gc)f (gd)e) = gxy.
Since g is primitive, we can write any two elements a, b ∈ Gq as a = gc, b = gd for some integers c, d ∈ Zq.
Substituting the powers of g in (5) gives
(gx)y = (aeb−f , af be), (6)
and the Fusion Exponential Function is found by observing that by (4), any pair (a, b) ∈ Gq × Gq =: Gp can
be written using powers of g as (gc, gd), such that with gx being represented by (a, b), from (6) we arrive at the
definition
(a, b)(e,f) := (aeb−f , af be),
satisfying (1) by construction. Since Gp is simply the direct product G2q , it is a group with component-wise mul-
tiplication. Having this together with Fp being a field, the properties (2) and (3) can be verfied instantly [34]. To
keep computing discrete logarithms hard, it is intrinsic that exponentiation is done using a basis of large order. In
Gq, every element g 6= 1 has maximum order q. An analogous result can be shown for Gp regarding the Fusion Ex-
ponential Function: every element g 6= 1 can be used to generate Gp using the Fusion Exponential Function, hence
the corresponding (fusion) discrete logarithm as the inverse function is well-defined. A proof for the fusion-setting
where Fp = Zq[X]/(X2 + 1) can be found in [34].
The focus of the remainder of this paper lies in extending the above constructive approach from n = 2 to any
n ≥ 1. Thus, achieving a definition for the Generalized Fusion Exponential Function.
4 Generalized Fusion Exponential Function
In this section, we generalize the approach of Section 3, such that exponents are n-tuples of integers in Zq and
bases are n-tuples of elements in Gq.
Remark 3. Again, we sometimes denote an n-tuple (x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈ Znq resp. (g0, . . . , gn−1) ∈ Gnq by the sans-
serif letter x resp. g. In contrast to Section 3, the components of an x are always referred to by the same letter xi
using the standard font and the associated index i.
4.1 Vectors in the Exponent
Let us replace the source of exponents by the Finite Field Fp := Zq[X]/(f) where f is an irreducible polynomial
of degree n, for some integer n ≥ 1, thus having p = qn. In order to provide a compact generalization of the
Fusion Exponential Function, we need to consider the multiplication in Fp in more detail. Let x, y ∈ Fp, written as
x =
n−1∑
i=0
xiX
i and y =
n−1∑
i=0
yiX
i
for some coefficients xi, yi ∈ Zq. Without loss of generality, assume f to be monic, and write
f =
(
n−1∑
i=0
fiX
i
)
+Xn
for fi ∈ Zq, i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1, and thus obviously,
Xn =
(
−
n−1∑
i=0
fiX
i
)
MOD f. (7)
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Furthermore, the (plain) product z = xy is of degree at most 2n, and the i-th coefficient zi is given by the Cauchy-
sum
zi =
∑
j, k ≥ 0
j + k = i
xjyk
for i = 0, 1, . . . , 2n. Thereby, xj = 0 for j > n − 1 and yk = 0 for k > n − 1. To find the remainder of
z = xy =
∑2n
i=0 ziX
i
, we can exploit the representation of Xn through coefficients of f as given in (7) [22]. This
extends to higher orders by taking
Xn+1 = XXn = X
(
−
n−1∑
i=0
fiX
i
)
= −
n−1∑
i=0
fiX
i+1,
which can again be decomposed recursively to reach a representation solely via the base monomials 1, X, X2, . . .,
Xn−1. Notice, that in this decomposition, only products of coefficients of f occur, which means that by rewriting
the 2n-order polynomial z in terms of 1,X,X2, . . . ,Xn−1, the resulting expressions for the coefficients become
nonlinear in each fi, but remain linear in each xi and in each yi for all i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1 (cf. the Cauchy sum).
Rearranging terms by pulling xj , for j = 0, . . . , n−1, out of all products for the i-th coefficient of xy and denoting
the factor associated with xj as λi,j(y) (omitting the coefficient vector of f because it is static) we can represent
the (modulo-reduced) product xy MOD f with coefficients z′i as
z′i =
n−1∑
j=0
xjλi,j(y) (8)
for i = 0, 1, . . . , n−1. Notice, that for any fixed f , λi,j : Fp → Zq is a known fixed function for j = 0, 1, . . . , n−1,
where the linearity in each coefficient of the input is inherited, thus having
λi,j(x) + λi,j(y) = λi,j(x+ y) (9)
for all x, y ∈ Fp.
Remark 4. For simplicity, we henceforth represent polynomials through the vector over their coefficients exclu-
sively, i.e. we write either (x0, . . . , xn−1) or x instead of
∑n−1
i=0 xiX
i
. Addition is as usual component-wise and
for multiplication we use our adapted representation
(x0, . . . , xn−1)(y0, . . . , yn−1)
(8)
=

n−1∑
j=0
xjλ0,j(y), . . . ,
n−1∑
j=0
xjλn−1,j(y)

 . (10)
4.2 Construction
Analogously to (4) we define
gx = g(x0,...,xn−1) := (gx0 , . . . , gxn−1), (11)
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where x ∈ Fp, x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) and g ∈ Gq \ {1}. In this setting we wish to calculate gxy, for y ∈ Fp, given
only gx = (gx0 , . . . , gxn−1) and y = (y0, . . . , yn−1). Carrying out the multiplication xy in Fp, we find
gxy = g(x0,...,xn−1)(y0,...,yn−1)
(10)
= g(
∑n−1
j=0 xjλ0,j (y),...,
∑n−1
j=0 xjλn−1,j(y))
(11)
=
(
g
∑n−1
j=0 xjλ0,j(y), . . . , g
∑n−1
j=0 xjλn−1,j(y)
)
(2)
=

n−1∏
j=0
gxjλ0,j (y), . . . ,
n−1∏
j=0
gxjλn−1,j(y)


(1)
=

n−1∏
j=0
(gxj )λ0,j(y) , . . . ,
n−1∏
j=0
(gxj )λn−1,j(y)

 . (12)
Hence, as in Section 3, we define
(gx)y = (g(x0,...,xn−1))(y0,...,yn−1)
(11)
= (gx0 , . . . , gxn−1)(y0,...,yn−1)
through (12) as
(gx)y :=

n−1∏
j=0
(gxj )λ0,j(y) , . . . ,
n−1∏
j=0
(gxj )λn−1,j(y)

 = gxy. (13)
Since we can write any element in Gq as a power of the primitive element g we can set g = (g0, . . . , gn−1) :=
(gx0 , . . . , gxn−1). Substituting the powers of g in (13) gives
gy =

n−1∏
j=0
g
λ0,j (y)
j , . . . ,
n−1∏
j=0
g
λn−1,j (y)
j

 (14)
for any g ∈ Gp and y ∈ Fp, fulfilling (1) by construction.
So far we used a basis that is an n-tuple of elements of Gq. However, we did not yet constrain the basis elements. To
ensure that property (2) holds, we need basis elements from Gp, being the direct product Gnq . Thus, for g,h ∈ Gq,
multiplication in Gp is again component-wise
(g0, . . . , gn−1)(h0, . . . , hn−1) = (g0h0, . . . , gn−1hn−1). (15)
The generalized construction fulfills (2) by the linearity assertion (9), because for any g ∈ Gp and x, y ∈ Fp we
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have
gx+y (14)=

n−1∏
j=0
g
λ0,j (x+y)
j , . . . ,
n−1∏
j=0
g
λn−1,j (x+y)
j


(9)
=

n−1∏
j=0
g
λ0,j (x)+λ0,j (y)
j , . . . ,
n−1∏
j=0
g
λn−1,j (x)+λn−1,j(y)
j


(2)
=

n−1∏
j=0
(
g
λ0,j (x)
j g
λ0,j (y)
j
)
, . . . ,
n−1∏
j=0
(
g
λn−1,j (x)
j g
λn−1,j (y)
j
)
(15)
=

n−1∏
j=0
g
λ0,j (x)
j , . . . ,
n−1∏
j=0
g
λn−1,j (x)
j



n−1∏
j=0
g
λ0,j (y)
j , . . . ,
n−1∏
j=0
g
λn−1,j (y)
j


(14)
= gxgy.
In the following examples are given for n = 1, 2, 3. For simplicity we use a matrix representation for all equations
with respect to (8) in the following manner for computing z′ = xy, where x, y ∈ Fp:
z′T = ΛxT , where Λ = (λi,j(y))ni,j=1 ∈ Fn×nq (16)
Accordingly, the following examples focus on the particular contents of Λ.
Example 1. Let n = 1, i.e. Fq = Z/qZ. Then with respect to Equation (16) we have Λ = (y0) which together with
g0 = g
x0 and Equation (14), one gets
gy = gλ00(y)0 = g
y0
0 .
Notice that ordinary exponentiation is hence a special case of fusion exponentiation.
Example 2. Let n = 2, i.e. Fq2 = Zq[X]/(X2 + 1). Then w.r.t. Equation (16) we have
Λ =
(
y0 −y1
y1 y0
)
which together with gj = gxj , for i, j = 0, 1, and Equation (14) gives
gy =
(
gy00 g
−y1
1 , g
y1
0 g
y0
1
)
.
Example 3. Let n = 3, i.e. Fq3 = Zq[X]/(X3 +X + 1), for instance. Then w.r.t. Equation (16) we have
Λ =

 y0 −y2 −y1y1 y0 − y2 −y2 − y1
y2 y1 y0 − y2


which together with gj = gxj , for i, j = 0, 1, 2, and Equation (14) gives
gy =
(
gy00 g
−y2
1 g
−y1
2 , g
y1
0 g
y0−y2
1 g
−y2−y1
2 , g
y2
0 g
y1
1 g
y0−y2
2
)
.
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Fusion and Mixing: The concept of fusion has yet only been intuitively introduced by requiring a dependency
of every component in the output on every component of the input. Similar concepts in cryptography exist, as
for example the avalanche effect calls for a similar influence on input bits on every output bit for a reasonable
block-cipher. Here, things are slightly more involved, but the matrix structure may provide an answer on how the
dependency relations look like. For example, if Λ is of diagonal shape, then this results in a mere component-wise
exponential function (cf. Equation (11)). Otherwise, if the matrix is reducible, then its rows and columns can
be permuted to reach a block-form, so that no cross-influence among blocks exist (a diagonal matrix is a trivial
example). In the fusion exponentiation setting, this amounts to a failure of the desired mixing properties, as the
set of input variables can be partitioned into at least two disjoint sets, with mutual influence present only within
subsets, but not across all variables. Though a rigorous proof is yet not available, the matrix Λ appears to never
have zero entries and is as such always irreducible. It would follow that the desired dependencies exist among all
variables, with no variable enjoying exceptionally stronger influence than any other.
4.3 Resulting Definition of Generalized Fusion Exponential Function
Since property (3) is redundant (cf. Remark 1), we can state
Definition 1. Let Fp be a field with p = qn, for some integer n ≥ 1, and Gp be the n-fold direct product Gnq , where
Gq is a group of prime order q. The Generalized Fusion Exponential Function is defined as
gx :=

n−1∏
j=0
g
λ0,j (x)
j , . . . ,
n−1∏
j=0
g
λn−1,j (x)
j

 (17)
for g ∈ Gp, x ∈ Fp and λi,j : Fp → Zq, as defined in Section 4.1.
Remark 5. Notice that for g = (g, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ Gp and 1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Fp (i.e. the 1-element in Fp) we have
g = (g, 1, . . . , 1) = (g1, g0, . . . , g0) (11)= g(1,0,...,0) = g1. (18)
4.4 Primitive Elements
In Gq, the discrete logarithm of y ∈ Gq to the base g ∈ Gq, g 6= 1, is well defined because q is prime. Since
|Zq| = |Gq|, exponentiation is bijective for exponents taken from Zq. This property is important to keep computing
discrete logarithms hard: any element g ∈ Gq, distinct from 1, is a generator of Gq. An analogous, and for
many cryptosystems mandatory, result is that generalized fusion-exponentiation is also bijective, thus, that any
g ∈ Gp \ {1} can be used to generate the n-fold direct product Gp = Gnq . However, by using the Generalized
Fusion Exponential Function. In fact, this is true:
Theorem 4. The Generalized Fusion Exponential Function is bijective.
Proof. Since |Gp| = |Fp|, it suffices to show that the Generalized Fusion Exponential Function is injective. As-
sume, that gb = gc for some b, c ∈ Fp and g ∈ Gp \ {1}. Through (11), g can be written as gx, for some
g ∈ Gq \ {1}, and some vector x ∈ Fp, which, applied to gb = gc, gives (gx)b = (gx)c. Through property (1) and
the commutativity of multiplication in Fp we can write (gb)x = (gc)x, which holds if and only if gb = gc. By the
injectivity of exponentiation in Gq this implies bi = ci for all components i = 0, 1, . . . , n−1 and hence b = c.
A consequence of this theorem is that given y ∈ Gp and g ∈ Gp \ {1} exactly one x ∈ Fp exists, such that y = gx.
This justifies the following definition as sound:
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Definition 2. Let g ∈ Gp \ {1}. The Generalized Fusion Discrete Logarithm is defined as follows:
fdlogg : Gp → Fp, fdlogg(y) = x, s.t. y = gx (19)
5 Fusion Discrete Logarithm Problems
In this section the Fusion Discrete Logarithm Problems are defined. Furthermore, some relations among these
problems and the standard setting are shown.
Definition 3. Let Fp, Gp and n be as used in Definition 1 and assume that they are publicly known. Furthermore,
let g ∈ Gp \ {1}.
1. Let y = gx, where x ∈ Fp. The n-Fusion Discrete Logarithm Problem (n-FDLP) is the following: given y
and g, find x.
2. Let y1 = gx1 , y2 = gx2 , where x1, x2 ∈ Fp. The n-Fusion Diffie-Hellman Problem (n-FDHP) is the
following: given y1, y2 and g, find gx1x2 .
3. Let y1 = gx1 , y2 = gx2 , y3 = gx3 , where x1, x2, x3 ∈ Fp. The n-Fusion Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem
(n-FDDP) is the following: given y1, y2, y3 and g, decide if x3 = x1x2.
PSfrag replacements
DLP DHP DDP
n-FDLP n-FDHP n-FDDP
trivial
trivial
trivial
trivial
Thm.5, [23]
unknown
unknown
unknown
Thm.6 Thm.6 Thm.7 Thm.7 Thm.8
Cor.2
could yield benefits (cf. Section 6)
Figure 1: Relations among (Fusion) Discrete Logarithm Problems, n > 2.
For reductions we use the following notation from complexity theory. Let A and B be two computational problems.
We say that A poly-time reduces to B if an algorithm can be given which, using an oracle for B as a subroutine,
can solve A with poly-time additional costs. This is denoted as A ≤P B. For the cases that A ≤P B and B ≤P A
hold, we write A ≡P B and say that ”A and B are computationally equivalent”.
Figure 1 illustrates some relations among the Discrete Logarithm Problems in the standard and in the fusion-setting.
Solving the n-FDLP leads to trivial solutions to the n-FDHP and the n-FDDP. Solving the n-FDHP leads to a trivial
solution to the n-FDDP. Hence, we have an analogous result as in the standard setting.
As mentioned in the introduction, DLP≡P DHP has been shown to hold for groups whose order is free of multiple
large prime factors [26]. This is the case for Gq, since q is prime. Having the trivial reduction DHP ≤P DLP we
state the following theorem as a reference to the results in [26]:
Theorem 5. DLP ≡P DHP
For the reductions in the fusion-setting we start with the relation between the n-FDLP and the DLP.
9
Theorem 6. For all n ∈ N we have n-FDLP ≡P DLP
Proof. For showing n-FDLP ≤P DLP, let y = gx, where g ∈ Gp \ {1} and x ∈ Fp. We wish to find x, given
only y, g and an oracle solving the DLP in polynomial time. Let g = (g0, . . . , gn−1) = (gw0 , . . . , gwn−1) and
y = (y0, . . . , yn−1) = (gz0 , . . . , gzn−1) for some g ∈ Gq \ {1}. We obtain wi = dlogg(gi) and zi = dlogg(yi), for
i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1, by using the oracle. Hence, we have
gx (11)= (gw)x (13)= gwx = gz
and thus z = wx ∈ Fp. Since w, z and Fp are known, one obtains x = zw−1. Notice that w 6= 0 since g 6= 1.
For establishing DLP ≤P n-FDLP let y = gx, where g ∈ Gq \ {1} and x ∈ Zq. We wish to find x, given only y, g
and an oracle solving the n-FDLP in polynomial time. Let y := (y, . . . , y) ∈ Gp and g := (g, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ Gp. By
(18), g can be written as g1, where 1 is the 1-element in Fp. Furthermore, through (11) y can be written as gx, for
x := (x, . . . , x) ∈ Fp. Hence we have
y = gx = g1·x (13)=
(
g1
)x (18)
= gx
and thus x = fdlogg(y) can be obtained by the given oracle, revealing x. Assuming the oracles are efficient, the
above reductions are efficient too.
An immediate corollary is the following:
Corollary 1. For all n,m ∈ N \ {0}, we have n-FDLP≡P m-FDLP.
From a security-point-of-view, this means that the fusion setting is an asset in providing algebraic properties, but
will not give increased security by hardening any underlying computational problem. We come back to this later,
when we discuss possible applications.
Based on Theorems 5 and 6 we can state
Theorem 7. For all n ∈ N we have, n-FDHP ≡P DHP
Proof. Due to Theorem 5 we have DLP ≡P DHP and together with Theorem 6 we thus have
DHP ≡P DLP ≡P n-FDLP ≥P n-FDHP.
For the reverse direction DHP ≤P n-FDHP let yi = gxi , where xi ∈ Zq, for i = 1, 2. Querying an ora-
cle for the n-FDHP with the inputs y1 = (y1, 1, . . . , 1), y2 = (y2, 1, . . . , 1) and g = (g, 1, . . . , 1) results in
y3 = (gx1x2 , 1, . . . , 1), since (y1, 1, . . . , 1) = (g, 1, . . . , 1)(x1,0,...,0), (y2, 1, . . . , 1) = (g, 1, . . . , 1)(x2,0,...,0) and
(x1, 0, . . . , 0)(x2, 0, . . . , 0) = (x1x2, 0, . . . , 0). Thus, y3 is stored in the first component of y3.
The result n-FDHP ≡P DHP together with DLP ≡P DHP and DLP ≡P n-FDLP gives the same relation between
the n-FDLP and the n-FDHP as in the standard setting, summarized in
Corollary 2. For all n ∈ N, we have n-FDLP ≡P n-FDHP
Regarding the DDP and the n-FDDP the situation is less clear. The following theorem shows the trivial reduction
from the DDP to the n-FDDP.
Theorem 8. For all n ∈ N, we have DDP ≤P n-FDDP
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Proof. Let yi = gxi , where xi ∈ Zq, for i = 1, 2, 3. Notice that (x1, 0, . . . , 0)(x2, 0, . . . , 0) = (x1x2, 0, . . . , 0).
Hence, querying an oracle for the n-FDDP with the inputs y1 = (y1, 1, . . . , 1), y2 = (y2, 1, . . . , 1), y3 =
(y3, 1, . . . , 1) and g = (g, 1, . . . , 1) results in 1, iff (x3, 0, . . . , 0) = (x1, 0, . . . , 0)(x2, 0, . . . , 0), and 0 other-
wise.
The reverse direction is unknown and might yield some security benefits (cf. Section 6). Also it is unkown whether
n-FDHP ≤P n-FDDP holds (as in the the standard setting).
Remark 6. Notice that the bit-security is always associated to the same prime q, since the standard and the fusion-
setting refer to the same security parameter q. Thus, the n-FDLP, regardless of how large n is, can never be harder
than the DLP. The attacks always work with running time in O(√q).
6 Possible Security Benefits
One interesting open problem is to show n-FDDP ≤P DDP, for n > 1 (of course n = 1 is trivial since 1-FDDP
= DDP). Since we want to find a generic algorithm, we are only allowed to use the group operations as black-
boxes and an oracle for solving the DDP in polynomial time. Such an orcale, however does not provide more than
true/false-decisions. All current approaches to give an efficient reduction to the DDP end up in the necessity to
have an oracle for solving the DHP. Such an oracle, however, is not available for this (direct) reduction from the
n-FDDP to the DDP (i.e. without solving the DHP or DLP).
The above stated open problems yield an interesting conjecture: if the computational equivalence between the DDP
and the n-FDDP cannot be shown for all n > 1, then the n-FDDP seems to be a stronger problem than the DDP
(at least for one n). Thus, if the DDP is efficiently solved directly (i.e. without solving the DLP or DHP), then
related cryptosystems like ElGamal or Cramer-Shoup will become vulnerable. However, if our conjecture remains
unrefuted, then such cryptosystems will still remain secure within the (generalized) fusion-setting.
7 Applications
It is obvious that the fusion-setting is less efficient than the standard setting. With n the number of exponentiation
in Gq increase with quadratic complexity. Asides from the possible security benefits as stated in section 6 the
following applications might be of interest:
Verifiable Secret Sharing in Fqn: Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [36] is normally used for sharing secrets in
Zq. It is secure against t < n passive adversaries. If the holder of a share sends a corrupted value during the
reconstruction phase the result is incorrect. To counter this problem mechanisms can be included to enable all
participants to jointly identify active malicious parties. Such sharing schemes are called Verifiable Secret Sharing.
Many of them make use property of (2) of exponentiation in Gq such that the verification of shares can be done in
hidden form. For the case that one wants to share a secret in Fqn then all such Verifiable Secret Sharing schemes
can be transferred to the fusion-setting, since Fusion Exponentiation provides the same property and security level.
Security Multi-Party Computation in Fqn with Active Adversaries: Secure multi-party computation over
shared secrets in Zq is well known [18, 17, 19]. The protocols with security against passive adversaries (like it
is the case for Shamir’s secret sharing) are generic in the way that they can also be applied if secrets are shared in
Fqn . For protocols being secure against active adversaries, verifiable secret sharings schemes as the ones mentioned
above are often used. Using Fusion Exponentiation again yields the benefit that security multi-party computation
over Fqn with respect to active adversaries can be realized using the fusion-setting.
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Threshold Cryptosystems in Gqn: Clearly, DL-based cryptosystems can be realized in the fusion-setting. Due
to the fact that verifiable secret sharing and secure multi-party computation can be used straightforwardly in Fqn ,
transforming DL-based threshold cryptosystem to the fusion-setting is easy.
Signature Schemes: Apart from the well-known concept of signature, such as put forth in the first papers about
public-key cryptography, a vast amount of more sophisticated concepts has evolved. As for instance, redactable
signatures [21] allow for exchanging certain parts of a document without invalidating a signature. Aggregate
signatures [3] permit assembly of several signatures into a single one, multisignatures [20] are the several-person-
pendant to a standard signature, and so on. As most of these are based on arithmetics that has been carried over to
the fusion-setting, fusion exponentiation appears as a natural candidate for constructing signatures with modifiable
components, or with several signatures being aggregated, yet still verifiable one by one.
8 Future Work
The full potential of fusion exponentiation is for sure not exhaustively described by this paper. Among the open
problems (which may yield security benefits compared to the ordinary setting) is a formalization of the fusion
properties (i.e. dependencies of output variables on input variables), and their connection to the structure of the
matrix Λ. This one may be the key for proving a property that is known as avalanche effect in different contexts.
Even more interesting is the potential for constructing sophisticated signature schemes, that otherwise (until now)
rely on more complicated algebraic structures like supersingular hyperelliptic curve groups and bilinear pairings.
Finally, the concept opens is fascinating from a purely algebraic point of view too, since it appears to be the first
generalization of the exponential function that carries over to vectors in the exponent in finite fields.
A Further Example-Instantiations of Fusion-Exponentiation
Example 9. Let n = 4, i.e. Fq4 = Zq[X]/(X4 +X + 1), for instance. Then w.r.t. Equation (16) we have
Λ =


y0 −y3 −y2 −y1
y1 y0 − y3 −y2 − y3 −y1 − y2
y2 y1 y0 − y3 −y2 − y3
y3 y2 y1 y0 − y3


which together with gj = gxj , for i, j = 0, . . . , 3, and Equation (14) gives
gy =
(
gy00 g
−y3
1 g
−y2
2 g
−y1
3 , g
y1
0 g
y0−y3
1 g
−y2−y3
2 g
−y1−y2
3 , g
y2
0 g
y1
1 g
y0−y3
2 g
−y2−y3
3 , g
y3
0 g
y2
1 g
y1
2 g
y0−y3
3
)
.
Example 10. Let n = 5, i.e. Fq5 = Zq[X]/(X5 +X2 + 1), for instance. Then w.r.t. Equation (16) we have
Λ =


y0 −y4 −y3 −y2 −y1 + y4
y1 y0 −y4 −y3 −y2
y2 y1 − y4 y0 − y3 −y2 − y4 −y1 − y3 + y4
y3 y2 y1 − y4 y0 − y3 −y4 − y2
y4 y3 y2 y1 − y4 y0 − y3


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which together with gj = gxj , for i, j = 0, . . . , 4, and Equation (14) gives
gy =
(
gy00 g
−y4
1 g
−y3
2 g
−y2
3 g
−y1+y4
4 , g
y1
0 g
y0
1 g
−y4
2 g
−y3
3 g
−y3
4 ,
gy20 g
y1−y4
1 g
y0−y3
2 g
−y2−y4
3 g
−y1−y3+y4
4 , g
y3
0 g
y2
1 g
y1−y4
2 g
y0−y3
3 g
−y4−y2
4
)
.
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